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Introduction 
Although kinetic architectural elements and struc-
tures have existed since antiquity and in different 
cultures,1 they were more widely recognised and 
developed throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century due to the rapid changes in the 
western way of life.2 In particular, from the Second 
World War until recently, transformable lightweight 
structures and deployable, mobile or portable envi-
ronments, built by architects and firms such as 
Buckminster Fuller, Hoberman associates and FTL 
Happold to name but a few,3 have sought to resolve 
economical, practical or ecological problems4 of 
the construction industry, and respond to issues of 
survival or nomadic dwelling.5 On the other hand, 
in the 50s and 60s, the development of computers 
and cybernetic control systems, inspired the design 
of more experimental transformable environments - 
such as Price’s Fun Palace, Archigram’s Living 1990 
installation and Constant’s New Babylon - able to 
respond to change and individuality. Such visionary 
projects would not result in realised architecture, 
yet they were precursors of the so-called ‘intelli-
gent environments’, the applications that emerged, 
since the beginning of the 90s, from the ambient 
intelligence vision, i.e. the distribution of ubiquitous 
digital technologies in physical space.6
Lately, the merging of kinetic architectural systems 
and digital technologies has produced digitally-
driven kinetic architecture, structures, environments 
or building components able to modify the shape, 
size or position of their physical form using embed-
ded computational technology. This is a vision for 
technologically-enhanced architecture with ‘natu-
ralised’ capacities - that is, sensing and actuation 
abilities, intelligence, motion and pro-active behav-
iour. Although such applications are rather limited 
and exist mostly in experimental and academic 
contexts, there is indeed a growing interest in the 
potential development of digitally-driven kinetic 
architecture. As Michael Fox of the Kinetic Design 
Group argues:
Architects need to design with an understanding 
of the current capabilities of embedded computa-
tion that have attained sufficient maturity to act as 
independent subsystems that can be beneficially 
incorporated into kinetic design.7
It is widely accepted that the primary goal of digit-
ally-driven kinetic structures is to provide flexible 
adaptation to constantly changing needs, desires,8 
and environmental conditions (optimisation and 
control).9 A part of the online text in the Muscle 
Room (a kinetic space by the Hyperbody Research 
Group) website reads:
The Muscle Room envisions a concept where the 
user can alter his surroundings to suit his every 
need. When the room is entered it is completely 
empty. One big, open space. By interacting with the 
room the user can get a different layout or appear-
ance.10
Similarly, Michael Fox and Bryant Yeh explain: 
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and Τrans_PORTs 2001, combine kinetic-mechan-
ical systems with computer technologies. Other 
similar projects are those of the Design Research 
Lab at the Architectural Association exploring the 
potential of kinetic responsive structures in the 
urban context.14 Maybe the most well-developed 
project in terms of feasibility, technical resolution 
and commercial potential is dECOi’s Aegis Hyposur-
face, a moving responsive surface, a kind of kinetic 
information display, actuated by pistons. Although 
it is not an architectural space, it can be incorpo-
rated in architectural structures or urban areas to 
provide informational and advertising services as 
well as interactive sensory experiences.15 Due to 
the limited scope of this paper I cannot examine the 
above examples one by one. Two of them, though, 
will be examined more closely here because they 
are highly illustrative of my argument: the E-mo-
tive House and the Muscle Tower II. Yet, the ideas 
discussed below apply to most of these projects.
Conceived as an information network node, 
the E-motive House [fig.1], designed by Ooster-
huis and his ONL team, is a changeable structure 
(constructed by a complex combination of pneu-
matic and hydraulic cylinders, wooden beams and 
air chambers) able, in theory, to respond to the 
actions, needs and desires of both local and inter-
net users. It will function in different ways: either 
as a space for work, food or sleep, thus realising 
something that would have seemed unconceivable 
in the past.16
However, besides the capacity to respond to 
changes of function, the description of the house 
includes a few other important characteristics. For 
Oosterhuis, the E-motive House is a ‘being’ with 
social skills and emotional states able to cooper-
ate, learn, communicate and participate in social 
interactions with its residents. Because of the 
complex interactions between all the factors that 
affect its performance, the behaviour of the house 
will be unanticipated and seemingly unpredictable, 
This research develops a concept for the application 
of smart environments to kinetic systems in architec-
ture. The goal is to create flexible and responsively 
adaptable architectural spaces and objects… Intel-
ligent kinetic systems are an approach for utilising 
technology to create architecture that addresses 
today’s dynamic, flexible and constantly changing 
activities.11
Konstantinos Oungrinis, in his research on kinetic 
architecture, proposed a digitally-driven archi-
tectural environment - the ‘Sensponder’ - which 
optimises adaptability by integrating all the different 
operational capacities of kinetic systems in architec-
ture. His ‘Sensponder’ architecture would be able 
to adapt to changing functional, environmental and 
structural demands by acquiring information from 
all available sources (through various sensors), and 
respond by performing local actions based on opti-
mised decisions.12
Yet, behind the obvious functional reasons for 
designing and constructing such structures, there is, 
in my view, another equally important cultural aspect 
that drives these designs. In this paper I will show 
that the motivation lies in a culturally-defined human 
tendency to challenge the boundaries between 
the animate and the inanimate or the human and 
machine. Thus, I aspire to anticipate a conceptual 
framework through which to reflect on their value. 
In the following I am looking into the way digitally-
driven projects are conceived. As I will show, they 
are not only understood as functional objects but 
also as ‘social beings’.
Digitally-driven kinetic structures: The E-motive 
House and the Muscle Tower II 
Some of the most representative digitally-driven 
kinetic structures are those of the Hyperbody 
Research Group and its director Kas Oosterhuis 
at TUDelft as well as Oosterhuis’ firm ONL.13 Their 
projects Muscle Tower I and II, E-motive House, 
Muscle NSA, Muscle Body, Muscle Reconfigured 
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Fig. 1: E-Motive House, 2002
Fig. 2: Muscle Tower II, 2004
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It is important to note here that the physical char-
acteristics of these structures (form and motion) 
should play a role in such attributions. For instance, 
Oosterhuis’ Muscle Tower II project, developed and 
constructed by the Hyperbody, ‘looks’ very much like 
a ‘living organism’ [fig.2]. A flexible frame consisting 
of a network of pneumatic actuator cylinders can 
stretch or contract, thus making the whole struc-
ture bend, swivel or twist in different points along 
its height.20
The range of movements that it can perform is 
limited to left-right and front-back shifts responding 
to the presence of visitors detected by its proxim-
ity sensors. A visitor’s presence will make it bend 
towards his or her direction for 30 seconds and 
then continue to perform its pre-programmed move-
ments.21 Video demonstrations of the structure in 
action, which can be found on its web site,22 show 
that, although the set-up is simple and its behav-
iour is based on on-off commands, the structure 
appears to react to human movements with unpre-
dictable position and posture changes. Here, the 
actual experience of the moving structure - its 
sudden shifts of direction and orientation along with 
its humanoid yet abstract form - may perceptually 
convey the sense of life.
It is true that seemingly autonomous self-gener-
ated motion, reactivity, as well as a number of other 
factors contribute to the perception of objects as 
alive, animate entities.23 One can easily assume, 
then, that architectural structures able to move, 
react, interact or self-act, may sometimes be 
perceived as animate. I will argue, however, that 
the tendency to see digitally-driven structures as 
‘alive’ cannot be explained merely in perpetual-psy-
chological terms, because the idea of architecture 
as a ‘living organism’ has been part of the language 
and conceptualisation of architecture since the 
19th century, and lately a recurring concept in the 
descriptions of intelligent environments and compu-
tationally-augmented architecture.
giving the impression of an emotional entity. It will 
incorporate intelligence, which will allow it, through 
interaction with people, to gradually develop a 
character and express a predefined series of 
psychological states (e.g. entertainment or educa-
tional state), challenging the residents to adapt to 
such an environment.17
Apart from functional flexibility, a number of other 
issues is mentioned with regard to the E-motive 
House here: learning, intelligence, pro-activity and 
intentional behaviour as well as the capacity for 
social interaction and cooperation for the produc-
tion of experiences. Describing the E-motive House 
Oosterhuis mentions the possible objects of discus-
sion between its residents:
What mood is your house in today? Isn’t it feeling 
well? Why is your house behaving so strangely 
lately? Perhaps it needs to see a doctor? Did you 
care enough for your house? Is your house boring 
you? Are you neglecting your house? Is your house 
suggesting that you might be boring in the way 
you perceive it? These would be the sort of social 
conversation topics between the inhabitants of 
e-motive houses.18 
It seems that Oosterhuis attempts to attribute quali-
ties beyond functional flexibility to the structure; 
he talks about it as if it is not just a soulless and 
inert environment but a ‘living organism’, a social, 
emotional being able to convey mood, a need for 
affection and communication. This attitude charac-
terises the way he understands his other projects as 
well, for example the Muscle Reconfigured project:
An intuitive interaction, opinionated towards seam-
less information exchange is initiated through the 
research experiment, hence transforming everyday 
utilitarian space into an inter-activating responsive 
organism.19
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What if buildings could function like living systems 
[...] A building that mimics a living system would be 
able to sense and respond appropriately to exterior 
conditions like varying winds, temperature swings 
or changing sunlight.30
Kynan Eng et al.’s ICRA 2003 conference paper 
describes the intelligent room ADA as an ‘artificial 
creature’,31 whereas in another point the authors 
mention that ‘the project Ada: intelligent space is an 
exploration in the creation of living architecture’,32 
explaining how this environment is perceived by its 
visitors as alive. Stephen Jones speaks even more 
literally about the relationship between intelligent 
environments and organisms:
In developing intelligent environments we lose the 
distinction between organism and environment. 
The environment becomes an organism because it 
does all the things that an organism does except, 
perhaps, self-replication. The kinds of processes 
that must be operating in the integration of artifi-
cial organisms are analogous to those operating 
in biological organisms. These include complex 
self-regulatory processes enabled by substantial 
feedback circuits [...] These are the sort of things 
that a brain or nervous system does in response to 
its earliest experience.33
Maria Luisa Palumbo points out that information 
technology links architecture to the living body:
The question of sensitivity now indissolubly links 
the body, machines and architecture. If the distin-
guishing factor between living and inorganic forms 
is essentially the capacity to exchange information 
with the environment and, consequently, flexibility 
in terms of the capacity to learn and modify, the key 
innovation of architecture in the second half of the 
20th century, characterised by its growing intimacy 
with machines, is the aspiration to give buildings the 
sensitivity and flexibility of living systems.34
In the following section I will open up this field of 
Architecture as a ‘living organism’
The use of biological metaphors and images within 
the architecture discipline is no recent phenomenon. 
Throughout the nineteenth century biological terms 
and metaphors (like ‘circulation’, ‘structure’ or ‘func-
tion’) were being used by architects in order to render 
aspects of architecture as objective categories that 
can be analysed with scientific methods.24 However, 
the most important adoption of biological metaphors 
in architecture took place after the Second World 
War through the language and projects of the archi-
tectural avant-garde within the cultural, scientific 
and philosophical context shaped by cybernet-
ics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Karl 
Popper’s attack on sociopolitical determinism.25 For 
example, the avant-garde group Archigram, reject-
ing any conceptual boundary between the organic 
and the inorganic (echoing cybernetics),26 designed 
architectural environments capable of respond-
ing to the indeterminacy of social and individual 
conditions27 based on biological concepts such as 
‘transformation’, a.k.a. ‘metamorphosis’.28
While Archigram’s approach to biological 
concepts in architecture was only iconographic, in 
Warren Brody’s 1967 article ‘The Design of Intel-
ligent Environments’, biological concepts such 
as complexity, self-organisation and evolutionary 
ability were regarded as inspirations for an active 
intelligent-responsive architecture able to learn 
from its users, self-act and anticipate behaviours 
based on acquired experience.29 This relationship 
between architecture and life becomes even more 
literal today as the vision of ambient intelligence 
embedded in architecture has led to a rhetoric that 
describes intelligent environments that can move, 
perceive, interact, self-act and learn, as ‘living’, 
‘social’ or ‘intelligent’. In many cases intelligent 
environments are even conceived of and described 
as living entities and artificial beings. For instance, 
an article in Wired magazine mentions the ability 
of buildings to mimic living systems, perceive and 
react to environmental stimuli: 
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architecture, which presents characteristics of living 
organisms (interaction, self-initiated motion), also 
as a marginal object. What I am presenting in the 
following section is a history of creation of marginal 
objects, in other words a history of contestation and 
redefinition of the boundary between biology and 
technology. I will thus attempt to argue that digitally-
driven structures can also be placed in this same 
context. 
Although actual examples and descriptions of 
marginal objects go back as far as antiquity,36 they 
have only been part of philosophical and cultural 
discourse since the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. During that time, automatic machines, 
a.k.a. ‘automata’, became part of philosophical 
and scientific culture, because, contrary to vitalism, 
mechanistic (clockwork) explanations of natural 
phenomena were extended to biological systems by 
Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy and his succes-
sors. More radical materialist philosophers of the 
period, such as Julien Offray de la Mettrie, would 
go as far as describe not only bodily processes but 
also mental functions in terms of mechanism.37 Yet, 
in Jessica Riskin’s view, eighteenth-century autom-
ata, such as Vaucanson’s Defecating Duck made 
to simulate the animal’s physiological processes, 
expressed the philosophical dispute between the 
mechanistic and the non-mechanistic interpreta-
tions of life, by attempting to determine the extent 
to which living beings could or could not be repro-
duced by mechanism. According to Riskin they 
resulted in ‘a continual redrawing of the boundary 
between human and machine and redefinition of the 
essence of life and intelligence’.38
Although, during the nineteenth century, vitalis-
tic views on life remained active even in scientific 
contexts, they were disputed by the development 
of the steam engine and the energy conservation 
law which showed that living organic phenomena 
- the production of heat and its conversion into 
mechanical energy, respiration and metabolism - 
‘alive’ objects that have been challenging the 
boundaries between the natural and the artificial 
by examining their practices and their presence 
historically. In this way I will be able to contextual-
ise digitally-driven kinetic architecture within a wider 
practice and discourse that sees ‘living’ artefacts 
as what MIT professor Sherry Turkle has termed 
‘marginal objects’. These are objects built to interro-
gate the boundaries between human and machine, 
the biological and the technological, because they 
stand on the boundary between the living and the 
non-living.
‘Living’ technological objects as marginal 
objects
Although common sense allows us to distinguish 
between living and non-living objects and entities 
as belonging to different categories, this distinction 
is not as straightforward for computational objects 
that, because of their phenomenal attributes, stand 
on the boundary between these categories. Sherry 
Turkle names them ‘marginal objects’:
Marginal objects, objects with no clear place, play 
important roles. On the lines between categories 
they draw attention to how we have drawn the lines. 
Sometimes in doing so they incite us to reaffirm the 
lines, sometimes to call them into question, stimu-
lating different distinctions […] Marginal objects are 
not neutral presences. They upset us because they 
have no home and because they often touch on 
highly charged issues of transition.35
Turkle develops her argument by looking into the 
reactions of adults, children and scientists to the 
first appearance of computational artefacts in the 
wider society of the 1970s which gradually entered 
the social and psychological life of people, affecting 
the ways they understood and thought about life. 
It was difficult to classify such objects in terms of 
whether they were animate or inanimate (this will 
be examined further down). In this text I am using 
Turkle’s concept to define digitally-driven kinetic 
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called soft A-Life) has argued that life includes any 
possible form, either physical or digital, conceived 
only in terms of the self-organising complex proc-
esses (evolution, natural selection, adaptation, 
learning, physical interactions) that constitute it.45 
Such scientific conceptions and definitions of life, 
along with the way digital A-Life forms are repre-
sented and referred to, enhance the perception 
of biological and artificial life equations, constitut-
ing, as Hayles has put it, ‘a multilayered system 
of metaphoric material relays through which ‘life’, 
‘nature’ and the ‘human’ are being redefined’.46 At 
the same time, however, some A-Life researchers 
have emphasised the importance of the material 
body - the physical structure of the organism - in the 
construction of artificial life.47 Moreover, people’s 
reaction to A-Life would emphasise sensuality and 
biological and physical embodiment as the basic 
constituents of life, separating them from A-Life 
objects.48
What seems to be dominant in this historical 
account of marginal-object production is the assump-
tion that the boundary between human and machine 
is either unbridgeable - in the romantic reactions 
were there was always a parameter, like emotion, 
that enhanced those boundaries - or non-existent - 
in artificial-life practices or cybernetics where there 
were no ontological differences between the natural 
and the artificial. In other words, this boundary, 
although under controversy and dispute (sometimes 
blurred, sometimes clear-cut), was always present. 
As Warren Sack puts it:
...such critiques assign a timeless, unchanging struc-
ture to what is better characterized as an on-going 
struggle to negotiate the ways in which the ‘artificial’ 
flows into the ‘natural’ and vice versa.49
It seems to me that digitally-driven architecture can 
be considered to be part of such a tradition of margin-
al-object production. I have already mentioned the 
ways in which this kind of architecture is conceived 
were also phenomena of machines.39 Later, in the 
mid-twentieth century the advent of cybernetics as 
well as molecular biology pointed to the view that 
human and machine, the organic and the inorganic, 
are all information-processing devices, systems that 
adapt and adjust to their environment on the basis 
of the flow and control of a common unit called 
information.40 This attempt was partly successful 
because of the way information was conceived and 
constructed in the scientific community and because 
of the electromechanical devices that were built by 
cyberneticists to demonstrate their ideas in reality.41 
In effect, the theories and machines of the scientific 
community of cybernetics, although constructed, 
resulted in a synthesis of humans and machines 
and became the means to challenge and blur the 
boundaries separating the living and the non-living.
This same attempt to equate the organic with 
the machinic was later led by the Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) community, which either regarded the 
human mind as an information-processing device, 
just like a computer, or the human brain as an 
emergent system, a model for the neural network 
of the connectionist approach to AI.42 Within both 
approaches, however, traditional boundaries and 
distinctions between the natural and the artificial 
would dissolve because humans and computers 
were conceptualised as either rule-based devices 
or non-deterministic systems.43 Yet at the same time 
both scientists and non-scientists would adopt a 
critical stance against this equation, arguing that AI 
suggests a flat mechanistic view of human nature; 
their critique, which Turkle calls ‘romantic’, would 
assume that what separates humans from comput-
ers is exactly that which cannot be coded, namely 
emotion and spontaneity.44
Human-machine boundaries are also challenged 
today in the practices and discourses of Artificial 
Life (A-Life), where digital entities are designed to 
simulate biological processes. In particular, since 
the end of the 1980s, the field of digital A-Life (also 
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science) from society and the self, and ‘hybridisa-
tion’, the mixing of nature and culture. Purification 
is what moderns pretend to be doing, Latour claims, 
because nothing is allowed to take place in-between 
nature and society (object and subject), the bound-
ary that defines all reality, although in practice they 
produce all kinds of nature-culture hybrids (quasi-
objects).52 The modern accepts these hybrids but 
conceives them as mixtures of two pure forms, things 
and subjects or humans and non-humans, which he 
separates at the same time in order to extract from 
them the subject (or the socio-cultural) part and the 
object (or the natural) part.53 This distinction is, for 
Latour, an imaginary construction because every-
thing takes place between society and nature, in a 
‘middle kingdom’ rejected by modernity - a central 
point of ‘departure’, not separation.54 Modernity 
explained everything but left outside what was in 
the middle - the production of hybrid technological 
objects in a post-industrial era of information and 
‘smart’ machines:
…when we find ourselves invaded by frozen embryos, 
expert systems, digital machines, sensor-equipped 
robots, hybrid corn, data banks, psychotropic drugs, 
whales outfitted with radar sounding devices, gene 
synthesizers, audience analyzers, and so on […] 
and when none of these chimera can be properly 
on the object side or on the subject side, or even in 
between, something has to be done.55
A-Life is one of those intriguing practices where 
the modern subject-object distinctions are rede-
fined. Lars Risan has noticed that although A-Life 
scientists construct artificial ‘living’ beings, at the 
same time they try to rid them of any subjectivity 
because they are considered to be scientific objects 
of inquiry. Yet, the difficulty in defining these distinc-
tions, Risan thinks following Latour, is due to their 
use of everyday language which makes it difficult to 
draw subject-object boundary lines: 
In our everyday language we - ‘moderns’ - have 
of or perceived in terms of human or biological 
attributes. Such attributes turn it into something 
more than a mere functional object; it becomes an 
object through which boundaries are interrogated, 
through which architecture acquires, once more, 
the status of an almost ‘living’ entity - a marginal 
object. But why do architects design digitally-driven 
kinetic structures endowed with such a status? To 
answer this question I will first have to answer the 
question why marginal objects are produced.
The most well-known reason for the production of 
artificial-life objects and images is the need to under-
stand what is unique about man and what separates 
man from machines, as Bruce Mazlish50 and Chris-
topher Langton have explained.51 It is, however, 
senseless to claim that the same reason applies 
for digitally-driven kinetic structures; although they 
present biological phenomena, like motion and 
interaction, they are not experimental simulations 
of biological processes, as is the case with A-Life 
objects. Digitally-driven kinetic architecture is not a 
scientific experiment but an architectural creation. 
Therefore, I think there is another reason driving the 
design of this kind of architecture that will become 
evident through the examination of the socio-cul-
tural dimension of this phenomenon.
The following section attempts to respond to this 
problem and come up with a new conceptualisation 
of digitally-driven architecture, one which will no 
longer see it only as a functional object but also as 
a culturally-defined quasi-object.
The Nature-Culture separatism in modernity 
Since the 1980s the social studies in science and 
technology have been challenging the dissociation 
between the natural and the cultural, the scientific 
and the social, the object and the subject prevalent 
in the last two centuries, exposing the hybrid forms 
with which things are represented. For anthropolo-
gist Bruno Latour modernity is a double process 
of ‘purification’, that is, separation of Nature (and 
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Bruce Mazlish locates this distinction and need 
for unification in a historical framework described by 
three discontinuities - artificial distinctions - in the 
western intellectual civilisation, which were over-
come by three great scientists of the past: the first, 
which placed man in a dominant separate position 
over the cosmos was overcome by Copernicus, the 
second, which separated man from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, was overcome by Darwin, and the 
third placed man over the subconscious (overcome 
by Freud).62 Mazlish explains that, as Copernicus, 
Darwin and Freud refuted these presumed discon-
tinuities, now it is necessary to subvert the fourth 
discontinuity, that is, the fallacy that humans are 
different from the machines they make.63 Examin-
ing the human-technology relationships through 
Darwinian theory, Mazlish argues that human 
nature includes both animal and machinic quali-
ties, because tools and machines are inseparable 
from human evolution.64 Human nature, then, is an 
evolving identity unfolding in terms of culture, our 
‘second nature’, expressed in the form of prosthetic 
devices, either tools or machines - a subject elabo-
rated by Freud, who called man a ‘prosthetic god’, 
and Norbert Wiener, who talked about devices like 
radars, jet engines and propellers in terms of pros-
thetic human or animal organs.65
Having said that, it now becomes clearer that 
there are cultural factors driving the conception of 
digitally-driven architectural structures, not unre-
lated to the philosophical discourse and practices of 
A-Life and marginal-object production. The machinic 
yet biomorphic and naturalised behaviour of these 
structures and the reference to them as if they are 
social entities, allowed me to place them within the 
discourse and practices of marginal objects in the 
history of A-Life. Such objects were understood as 
challengers of human-machine discontinuity as well 
as possible means to reunite humans with objects 
and machines. Similarly, digitally-driven kinetic 
architecture could also be regarded as a machine, 
an artificial marginal object, ‘trying’ to acquire life, to 
always been  ‘non-moderns’; ‘witch doctors’; we do 
in practice endow our objects with a lot of subjective 
properties. Unlike, for example, physics, Artificial 
Life is a technoscience where it is hard to maintain 
a clear-cut boundary between everyday language 
and scientific models.56
In his text, Mixing Humans and Nonhumans 
Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer, Latour 
(using the nickname Jim Johnson),57 discusses 
the problem of human-machine separation in the 
case of an automatic door-closer. He analyses how 
this purely technical object is clearly a moral and 
social agent, an anthropomorphic entity because it 
replaces humans and shapes human actions. He 
objects to the separating lines between humans and 
technological objects placed by sociologists; he sees 
only actors who are either human or non-human.58 
Such seemingly animate technological objects, 
social actors in Latour’s view, especially apparent in 
the work of A-Life and the field of sociable robotics 
mentioned earlier, challenge modernity’s human-
machine distinctions. Lucy Suchman discusses 
A-Life within the wider philosophical problem of 
human-machine distinction and the autonomy of 
the machine:  
Having systematically established the division of 
humans and machines, technological imaginaries 
now evidence worry that once separated from us 
machines are rendered lifeless.59 
She further explains that the insistence on the 
human-machine distinction within the modern tradi-
tion drives the prospect of constructing autonomous 
anthropomorphic machines in order to be human-
ised, i.e. ‘to be made like us - in order that we can 
be reunited with them’.60 However, as Suchman 
points out, although aiming at the opposite, the 
actual production of intelligent robotic machines lies 
in the modern tradition of the post-enlightenment 
era which regards separation and autonomy rather 
than relation as characteristics of humanity.61 
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What then is the impact of the above observa-
tions and this alternative way of understanding 
digitally-driven structures? Are these observations 
obstacles to their actual functional potential and 
aim? Do designers have to change their attitude 
towards their conception and design? I think the 
answer to these questions is twofold.
On the one hand, designing and constructing 
such structures is indeed an important experiment 
for the evaluation of their behaviour, functional 
capacities and potential. Unlike closed determin-
istic machines, these ‘naturalised’ machines seem 
to open possibilities. They can be considered to be 
‘virtual machines’, that is, architecture with undevel-
oped potential, awaiting the activation of possible 
functions and uses not yet actualised.67
On the other hand, we should not look at these 
structures as fanciful expressions of anthropo-
morphic qualities, which could obscure their real 
functional potential. Since functional flexibility and 
environmental adaptation are, and should be, the 
main reasons for designing and building such struc-
tures - otherwise they should not be considered 
architecture - it is important to acknowledge that 
sometimes simple approaches may lead to signifi-
cant results. Flexibility and adaptation is not only a 
matter of mechanical and digitally-driven motion of 
structures but it can be a property of inert structures. 
Buildings can alter their environment and spatial 
organisation through the use of mobile elements 
(moving partitions, retractable roofs, kinetic panels 
or louvers on ‘smart’ building skins) which can 
achieve, with rather discrete motions, extensive 
changes in function and overall performance. For 
instance, think of the way that small motions of 
‘smart’ façade louvers can result in significant 
changes in the building’s environmental behaviour 
and interior conditions. 
There is no space here for further elaboration 
of these ideas. However, the contribution of this 
become living organism in order to subvert Mazlish’s 
fourth discontinuity. Its animate, seemingly human 
features, - motion, pro-activity and responsiveness 
- turn it into a prosthetic extension of humans and 
human functions (perception, action, intelligence), 
echoing the way Oosterhuis has conceptualised his 
E-motive House project: ‘a social semi-independent 
extension of the human bodies of the inhabitants.’66
Conclusions
By analysing the concept of the marginal object, its 
historical framework and the socio-cultural factors 
driving its construction, I have built a conceptual 
framework in order to support my view regarding the 
reasons behind the design of digitally-driven kinetic 
architecture. I have argued that these designs are 
led by a wider socio-cultural (and perhaps psycho-
logical) drive which can be observed in different 
artificial-life objects and ‘living’ machines. If the task 
of A-Life practices is to subvert the human-machine 
discontinuity pointed out by Suchman and Mazlish, 
then the design and construction of ‘living’ digital-
ly-driven structures, like the E-motive house, the 
Muscle Tower II, or dECOi’s Hyposurface must be 
part of this task to ‘humanise’ the machine-archi-
tecture, to undermine the nature-artifice boundary. 
Digitally-driven kinetic structures should not only 
be considered as functional objects but should also 
be seen as quasi-objects, which, in the context of 
Latour’s nature-culture separatism critique, are 
constructed to challenge and reunite subject and 
object, human and machine. Yet, it should be clari-
fied here that this bonding is not literal: it does not 
mean an actual unity between human and structure. 
It is only a conceptual interpretation of the possibility 
for prosthetic relations that such anthropomorphic 
structures generate due to the illusory percep-
tion that they are ‘alive’ entities. To achieve such 
a bonding, that is, an actual experience of unity 
between the human and the structure, one should 
look into other, more intimate devices, practices and 
discourses within fields such as human-machine 
interaction and the cyborg metaphor.
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